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The politics of migration in India: What it is; and what to do? 
 
 






ABSTRACT: Migration has increasingly become a worldwide 
phenomenon supporting the livelihoods of a large number of 
people. But it can also be a potential source of conflict which is 
evident in India in general and its northeast region in particular. 
As a result the country’s federal government has undertaken 
different measures for controlling illegal cross-border immigration 
into the country.  But not so useful because the measures were 
undertaken largely due to the political compulsion, without taking 
into account the historical ties between the sending and the 
receiving countries. This failure has of course further led to the 






Migration is commonly known as the permanent or semi-permanent change of 
residence, usually across some types of administrative boundary (Wood 1994: 
607) brought about by a number of push-and-pull factors. Migration depends on, 
and brings, a number of issues having demographic, economic, social and 
political dimensions. Over 740 million people migrated inside their own country, 
while over 200 million did so across national borders (UNDP 2009: 1-2). An 
increasing number of countries are now either the places of origin, transit or 
destination for migrants, and increasingly are all three simultaneously (Berne 
Initiative 2004: 2-8). As a result the division between the sending and the 
receiving countries is no longer relevant because the distinction between the 
countries representing “push” factors and those representing “pull” factors 
become questionable, since most countries simultaneously display both  (Duvell 
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2010: 289-310). The migrants were also said to gained higher income, better 
access to education and health care and better prospects for their children (UNDP 
2009: 1-2). 
 
But, migration is affected by enormous restrictions. The state migration 
control was said to be the key factor that determined the character and direction of 
migration flows in the 19th century (Fahrmeir et al 2003: 3). The governments of 
the labour-sending countries considered the migration of their high-skilled 
workers into another country as brain-drain and national loss, while encouraging 
the unskilled ones to do so because the latter could bring remittances, new skills 
and the like. In turn they welcomed high-skilled workers, not the unskilled ones. 
The context of their reception in the host societies could be of low receptivity; 
permitted, but not actively encouraged; and privileged reception, who received 
active legal as well as material assistance from the host governments (Portes and 
Bach 1989: 606-30). 
 
Those who could not fulfill the requirements to migrate legally resorted to 
irregular means. The potential migrants paid huge money to the trafficking agents 
to take them to the desired destinations. Such migration is a form of irregular 
migration (Carretero 2008: 1) which occurs outside the authorized means of 
entering the national border (Carling 2007: 5). Yet, it is difficult to construct a 
typology of such migration, or even to know what terminology to use, due to the 
complexity of the issue and diverse contexts in which it occurs (Brennan 1984: 
409). It has become prominence in public discourse because the political 
processes of state-building define the extent of the state’s territory and its national 
space. Therefore migration control becomes a tool of demarcation and of 
enforcement of its crucial means. In short, the irregular migration supposedly 
defies the self-contained autonomy of the nation states (Morris 1997: 192), but it 
has become an inherent aspect of global migration (Duvell 2005: 16). 
 
Migration is a subject of interest among social science disciplines, 
however there are deep theoretical divide based on disciplines, paradigms and 
political positions (Castles 2008: 7). It is studied and interpreted within the 
nationalist frameworks (Schendel. 2005: 2-3), and much of the literature is 
prescriptive that attempt to persuade the readers to support one or another solution 
to the problem. Hence, much of the recent literature aimed primarily at an 
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IMMIGRATION INTO NORTHEAST INDIA 
 
The colonial Assam, which was then constituted most part of northeast region of 
India, came into increasing contact with the colonial Bengal after being 
incorporated into the British colonial empire. This naturally brought a significant 
transformation in the society, economy and polity of Assam as well as other part 
of the region. Initially, the skilled manpower from Bengal was recruited to assist 
the colonial officers in running the day-to-day administration, whereas previously 
only some artisans, weavers and scholars came there. Then since the demand for 
labour was high due to the rapid expansion of tea plantation, coal mining and oil 
exploration, the labour recruitment from other part of the empire was also started. 
 
In addition, the territorial boundary of colonial Assam was altered. It was 
administered as a part of Bengal from 1826 to 1873, subsequently became a 
province after the integration of the Bengali-populated areas of Cachar, Sylhet 
and Goalpara respectively in 1874. The twin provinces of Bengal and Assam were 
again reorganised in 1905 to facilitate the formation the provinces of (1) East 
Bengal and Assam, and (2) Bengal respectively. This was annulled in 1912. 
 
The integration of Cachar, Sylhet and Goalpara into Assam along with the 
prominence role played by the educated Bengalis in the colonial administration 
helped create conditions favorable for the expansion and consolidation of the 
Bengali language in Assam. It became the court language and then the language 
of education, from 1837 to 1874. This happened much against the wishes of the 
Assam’s largest linguistic group, the Assamese. Subsequently, the Bengali 
language was replaced by the Assamese language. 
 
When the colonial rule came to an end the empire was divided and the 
territories were allocated along religious lines in which a part of Bengal became 
the eastern part of Pakistan. This was not a smooth affair, the territorial disputes 
and communal riots caused forced migration of refugees between the divided 
territories. Thus when great powers allocated territories and permitted the creation 
of new states hundreds and thousands of people (about 14.5 million Muslims and 
Hindus) were forced to become immigrants and refugees. In the 1960s, the 
alleged religious persecutions and the construction of Kaptai hydroelectric dam in 
Pakistan (East) forced many Chakmas to flee towards India. Further, during the 
Bangladesh liberation war against Pakistan (the war ended with the liberation of 
Bangladesh on 16 December 1971), hundreds of thousands of refugees moved 
towards East and Northeast India. Many of them settled down in India after the 
war. In addition, there has been considerable movement of people from Pakistan 
(East)/Bangladesh into India in the hope of improving their livelihoods. However, 
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neither India nor Bangladesh maintained any reliable records of the movement of 
people. 
 
One wonder, why it was, and has been mostly one-way movement of 
immigrants and refugees. With a total population of about 142 millions in 2011, 
Bangladesh is one of the most densely populated countries in the world having a 
population density of about 964 persons per sq km. The land-man ratio in 2010 
was .06 ha. The country is also a poor country. Further the country is highly prone 
to natural disasters such as flash flood, riverbank erosion and landslide. As a 
result, many people were left homeless each year due to the natural disasters. For 
instance, flooding has been a regular feature destroying lives and properties 
almost every year. One-fifth of the country used to be flooded every year and in 
extreme years, two-thirds of the country (Agrawala et al 2003: 9-70). Thus almost 
all arable land is being used with little scope for any significant expansion of 
cultivation into new areas, and the landholdings are small and fragmented with 
88.5 per cent of farms less than 1.0 hectare (ha) occupying 60 per cent of the 
farmland area (Asian Development Bank 2005: 1-6). Further, the country is 
surrounded by India, sharing about 4096.7 km long land border. 
 
On the other hand, India is also a poor country, yet it is over 22-times the 
area of Bangladesh, and it has an average population density of 382 persons per 
sq km in 2011, far below that of Bangladesh. The density of population is further 
less in the northeast region. Moreover, the people of the northeast region are not 
so familiar to work in new residential areas and communities. They are also not so 
used to menial and low paid works. The immigrants usually do such odd works. 
Thus when a significant number of immigrants were recruited into such 
occupations, they became socially undesirable for the native workers. The latter 
will be less incline to do such occupations. Migration can therefore change the 
social definition of work, causing a certain occupations to be defined as 
stigmatizing and viewed as culturally inappropriate for the native workers. This 
stigma came from the presence of immigrants, not from the characteristics of the 
occupations (Bohning 1974: 155-163). In such situation the main assets the 
immigrants bring to the destination places are cheap labour, willingness to work 
harder and loyalty. In short, the immigrants, largely poor and illiterate, are ready 
to do jobs the local residents rejected. The migrants work in the agricultural 
fields, in homes, as rickshaw pullers and manual labourers. They are preferred by 
the local contractors because they provide cheap labour. Further, the shared 
culture and history of the two countries also provide social networks for 
migration. The aforementioned factors naturally encouraged immigration into the 
northeast region of India. 
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The immigration-induced ethnic conflict surfaced in Assam after the Bengali 
language became the language of court and education in Assam. As the 
Assamese-speaking protested the Bengali language was replaced by the Assamese 
language. This marked the beginning of conflict between two main linguistic 
groups.  
 
On the other hand, the total population of immigrants, legal or illegal, is 
never known, and the available estimates are confusing, ranging from some lakh 
to 15 million. These estimates depend on the agenda of those reporting. The 
immigrants came from Bangladesh, Nepal and other parts of India in which about 
60 per cent of the 5.1 million immigrants, by their last residence outside India, 
came from Bangladesh alone (Census of India 2001). 
 
Immigration has been widely attributed as the main cause of high rate of 
population growth in Assam and other parts of the region. There were also the 
allegations of the manipulations of electoral lists to enroll the immigrants. Over 
50 territorial assembly constituencies in Assam had reported 20 per cent increase 
in voters between 1994 and 1997, while the national average was just 7.4 per cent. 
Similar increase had also been reported in West Bengal (Swain 1996: 189-204). 
The cross-border immigration has reduced Tripura’s tribal population to a 
minority, making it the only state in the country that has been transformed from 
being a predominantly tribal to a non-tribal state. In the 2001 census, the 
scheduled tribes constituted about 31 per cent of the population of 3.2 million, 
while six decades earlier they comprised about 50 per cent of the population. As a 
result the immigrants were accused of taking jobs from Indian citizens, exactly 
what the Maharashtra Navnirman Sena did in Mumbai. As a result, immigration 
has been seen as the threat to the local people. 
  
After the partition, when Syllet district was detached from Assam and 
awarded to Pakistan, the Assamese-speaking people became the single largest 
linguistic group in Assam. After the reorganisation of states on linguistic lines in 
the 1950s, the Assamese middle class further tried to consolidate their language in 
the education and administration. The Assamese became the official language of 
the state (Bengali in the Cachar district and English in the autonomous districts). 
The Gauhati University, the oldest university in Assam, also passed a resolution 
to make Assamese the medium of instruction in the colleges under its jurisdiction. 
These policies have resulted in the alienation of other ethnic groups thereby 
strengthening ethnic assertiveness and polarization in the state. Down the line it 
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became evident that ethnic groups viewed the state government as an instrument 
by which to extend, consolidate or transform their position in the economy and 
social system (Weiner 1983: 284). Weiner elaborated that in the 19th and early 
20th century, the Bengali Hindus used their dominance in the government to 
consolidate their position in the education and administration. In the 1930s and 
1940s, when electoral politics were introduced, the Bengali Muslims won control 
over the government and then attempted to use their position to facilitate 
migration of Bengali Muslims. After independence, the Assamese retained power 
and used that control to assert the paramountcy of Assamese cultural identity and 
to seek economic and social equality in relation to the Bengali Hindus (Weiner 
1983: 279-292). 
 
It is also interesting to see how some immigrant groups were thought to be 
more threatening than the others. The Adivasis and Nepalese were engaged in tea 
plantation, cattle rearing and the like the occupations the native workers were 
least interested. Hence they were least problematic. The problem started with 
those who could compete for the government jobs. When the Assamese middle 
class started competing with the Bengali-middle class the former had always been 
the weak contenders. Moreover, the Bengalis wanted to assert the paramountcy of 
their language and culture in Assam. The Assamese fear of losing their cultural 
autonomy dated back to 1837 when the Bengali language was introduced as 
language of education and administration. The Assamese historical narratives 
typically refer to this period as a dark period of Assamese language, literature and 
culture (Baruah 1999: 71). 
 
After the language issue was partially settled, the Assamese middle class 
turned towards the illegal cross-border immigration. The state-building in India 
had also started categorizing the immigrants along religious lines, and hence the 
Muslim immigrants were considered more problematic than their Hindu 
counterparts. The former came to be treated as the illegal immigrants while the 
latter as the refugees. The Assamese Muslims also started facing an identity crisis 
because they were often branded as immigrants by anti-immigrant lobbyists. This 
contributed to their alienation from the society in which they coexisted for 
centuries. 
 
The death of Hiralal Patwari (then a member of lok sabha of the country’s 
parliament), representing Mangaldai territorial constituency of Assam) in 1979 
necessitated holding of by-election which set in motion events leading up to the 
anti-immigration movement led by the All Assam Students’ Union (AASU), the 
main student group of the state. It was alleged that a large number of names of 
suspect nationalities was included in the electoral list of Mangaldai territorial 
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constituency. Consequently, the agitations were started demanding recounting of 
the citizenship of those living in Assam on the basis of the national register of 
citizens prepared during the Indian Census of 1951. The movement came to an 
end following an agreement, popularly known as the Assam Accord. The central 
government promised to take actions to identify and deport all noncitizens, 
officially known as “foreigners” and protect the cultural identity of the “Assamese 
people”. The accord fixed March 24th, 1971 as the cutoff date for the 
identification and deportation of foreigners from Pakistan (East) into Assam. It 
also provided for citizenship to those who came to Assam between January 1st, 
1966 and March 24th, 1971 after defranchising for a period of 10 years subject to 
registration. Thus, it was written in the accord that those who crossed the 
international border into Assam without proper legal documents after the March 
25th, 1971 were illegal immigrants; but all those who came before this deadline 
became citizens through the legal process akin to naturalization. 
 
In neighbouring Tripura, the post-1947 migration had outnumbered the 
tribal population. About 0.6 million refugees came to Tripura between 1947 and 
1971 and were rehabilitated under different schemes, enabling some of them to 
settle down with financial assistance and some just helping them to buy land. 
These schemes accelerated the process of large scale loss of lands belonging to 
the tribal people (Bhaumik and Jayanta 2005: 216-241). The tribal people 
gradually lost their land to the recent immigrants, and the later started controlling 
the economy and polity of Tripura. The Bengali language along with English was 
made the official languages of Tripura in 1964, whereas Kokborok, the native 
language, managed to get the second language status only in 1979. The voices of 
dissent grew louder which ultimately culminated into an armed conflict. 
 
In Assam, the founding members of ULFA had understood beforehand 
that the anti-immigration movement would not serve the expected benefits 
because the India’s central government would not listen to mere strikes. The 
armed group started as a more militant stream of the movement and gradually 
broke away from the moderate forces that were associated with it (Das 2007: 12). 
They were right; the promises made in the Assam Accord remained largely 
unfulfilled. Samujjal Bhattacharya, a student leader, stated “till now we have not 
been benefitted from that accord” and the central government has done “nothing 
to safeguard the identity of the indigenous people.”  Bhattacharya cited how the 
central government took the initiative of guarding the India-Pakistan border 
within two years with barbed wire fencing, roads, flood-lights and guards 
patrolling all along the border. He said that the India-Bangladesh border has been 
as porous as before and hence anybody could come to Assam without any visa or 
passport (see, Bhattacharya 2004: 181-184). 
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After the signing of the accord the leaders of the movement floated Asom 
Gana Parishad, a political party, in 1985. Those who opposed the said accord 
floated United Minorities Front, also a political party. The Asom Gana Parishad 
had promised to fully implement the accord, whereas the United Minority Front 
was against its implementation. The Asom Gana Parishad won the legislative 
elections held in 1985 and 1996, respectively, but failed to arrive a consensus on 
this contentious issue. 
 
The ULFA rebels were not born over-night. They started with some kinds 
of social movement. For instance, Paresh Barua, the top leader, was once an 
active member of the anti-immigration movement. Some of the founding 
members of ULFA were also then worked for the Asom Jatiyatabadi Chhatra Juva 
Parishad, a students’ organisation. Many insurgent groups in the region have their 
origins in broader social movement, and they often began as a smaller subset of 
individuals within a mainstream social movement who are willing to pursue more 
radical strategies for political and social change by opting for violent means. 
Their radicalization resulted from a number of factors including inaction by the 
government to meet the popular demands, the repressive reactions of the 
government, an ideology of change that accepts the use of violence as legitimate, 
competition for the scare resources from other social movement organisations and 
perception that other social movements organisations are weak in their effort to 
achieve change (Hazen 2010: 81). An insurgent group is thus a particular type of 
social movement organisation (Hazen 2010: 82) that possesses organizational 
means to carry out sustained attacked against the government. The ULFA is 
therefore a social movement organisation. 
 
Unfortunately, the anti-immigration movement had further led to the 
ethnic assertiveness and division. For instance, about 1819 people, mostly Muslim 
peasants of East Bengal origin, were killed in an attack organised by the rival 
communities in and around Nellie village of Assam in February 1983. The 
victims had participated in the legislature election of 1983 defying a poll boycott 
called by those demanding the holding of the election on the basis of a revised 
electoral list. Such incident caused a sense of insecurity among the Assamese-
speaking Muslims which halted, for the first time, the process of their assimilation 
with the Assamese society (Ahmed and Yasin 1997: 148). Like any other 
Assamese they had also participated in the said movement (Udayon 1999: 1269). 
Thus many Muslims have alienated from the Assamese society in which they live 
for centuries.  In neighbouring Tripura a deadly communal rioting in 1980 
involving tribal and non-tribal people killed several hundreds of people. 
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The Assam Accord also soon became controversial because it only 
promised to protect and promote the culture, social and linguistic identity of the 
“Assamese people” only. Other ethnic groups who were unwilling to be treated as 
the Assamese people felt that the accord might legitimize the imposition of 
Assamese culture on them. As a result, other ethnic groups were encouraged to 
raise the demand for the bifurcation of Assam to facilitate the creation of new 
states. The Bodos started a movement to get a separate state and if succeeded 
might have divided Assam for the straight fifth times. It however did not happen 
but led to the granting of increased autonomy to certain parts of the state. 
 
The immigration-induced conflict came into limelight from time to time. 
The most recent one was the violent conflict between Bodos and Muslims that 
took place in Assam’s Bodoland region in 2012. It had claimed over 80 people 
and about 5 lakh people were temporarily displaced. As expected the politicians 
tried to intervene. According to the leaders of Bodoland People’s Party, the ruling 
party in Bodoland, the violence was a conspiracy to destabilize Bodoland 
Territorial Council. They stated that it was incited by “foreigners” and accused 
“illegal immigration” from Bangladesh as the root cause. On the other hand, the 
All India United Democratic Front, the Assam-based political party, accused 
Bodoland Territorial Council of promoting violence against the Muslims. The 
party alleged that it was aimed at driving out the non-Bodos from Bodoland. The 
party said the Bodos which constitutes only about 29 per cent of the total 
population wanted to dominate the Bodoland region. The Bodoland had witnessed 
several bloody conflicts in the past, between Bodos and Muslim settlers and also 
between Bodos and Adivasis. Why was that so? The problem was linked to the 
movement for separate state by the Bodos, immigration from Bangladesh and 
struggle for the control of political power and natural resources. The violence 
conflict has far reaching impact beyond Northeast India. Since the violence was 
projected as an assault against the Muslims unspecified miscreants had succeeded 
in spreading rumours of violent attack against the people of the region residing 
and studying in various cities of the country. The rumors forced thousands of 
students and workers to flee from Bangalore, Hyderabad and Pune to their 
natives’ places. However, no untoward incidents took place. A faction of ULFA 
reacted and warned actions against “Indians” in Assam if “atrocities” of the 
Assamese people did not stop in other parts of the country. It also charged 
Badaruddin Ajmal, the leader of All India United Democratic Front, of spreading 
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THE POLICY DILEMMAS 
 
Bangladesh has all along denied the presence of their citizens in India. In 1999, 
the then Bangladesh prime minister, Sheikh Hasina Wajed, stated: “There are no 
Bangladeshi infiltrators in India. Why should a Bangladeshi national cross over 
and relocate in a foreign country?” Again in 2003, the then Bangladesh foreign 
minister, Morshed Khan, stated “there is not a single Bangladeshi migrant in 
India.” Bangladesh accused India of evicting Bengali-speaking Muslims by 
branding them as Bangladeshis. According to Willem van Schendel (2005: 200), 
Bangladeshis in India are “truly transnational” in three ways. First, they are not 
accepted as Indian citizens and live the shadow existence of “illegal” immigrants 
worldwide, a floating underclass who are in India, but not of it. Second, their 
motives of crossing the border have long stopped being related to nationalist 
ideologies. They have joined many migrants worldwide in pursuing the good life 
that is denied to them back home. And third, like their counterparts all over the 
world, they think transnationally, when they remit money and make occasional 
visits back home. Schendel further added that it was not impossible for 
Bangladeshi opinion leaders to start portraying migrants to India as “cultural 
heroes”; people who against enormous odds were able to rely on their own wits to 
survive and create new cultural and social forms of transnational Bangladeshi 
identity. Until that time, their discourse on migration to India is likely to be 
marked by denial, disdain and disinformation. 
 
Among the familiar Indian complaints are: “illegal migration is affecting 
our national security”, “illegal migration has become a serious problem for India”, 
“they are eating into the economy of the country and to a large extent are a 
security threat” and the like. On the other side of the divide, the familiar 
statements of denial by Bangladesh are: “there are no Bangladeshi refugees in 
India any more”, “there is no question of our taking any people back”, “it is an 
internal problem of India”, “under no circumstances accept any of the evicted 
persons” and the like. As a result, open confrontations along the border broke out 
whenever the Indian border guards tried to deport the “alleged noncitizens” whom 
their Bangladeshi counterpart claimed as “Indians.” These official positions have 
had serious consequences on the individual migrants. 
 
In the wake of the anti-immigration movement in Assam, the country’s 
federal government enacted a special legislation for Assam to identify noncitizens 
and later a slew of border control measures. In 1983, the country’s parliament 
passed the Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Act, 1983 (popularly 
known as the IMDT Act). Its intention was to detect and deport noncitizens, 
officially refer as “foreigners,” staying in Assam when the Foreigner Act, 1946 
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was applied in the rest of the country. This Act defines “foreigner” as those who 
illegally settled down in Assam after March 25th, 1971, and the onus of proof 
shall lie with the complainant. The Foreigners Act puts the onus on the accused to 
prove his/her Indian nationality and it was applicable to Assam too before the 
IMDT Act was promulgated. Two decades later, the IMDT Act was struck down 
by the country’s supreme court in a judgment delivered in July 2005. The court 
held that the IMDT Act acted as the biggest hurdle in the identification and 
deportation of noncitizens. Since then the Foreigner Act has been reinforced in 
Assam. 
 
In addition, the policing along the Indian side of the India-Bangladesh 
border have strengthened with the construction of border fencing, border roads 
and floodlighting in order to prevent cross-border immigration and other illegal 
activities. There were problems in the construction of fencing in certain stretches 
due to riverine and low lying areas, population within 150 yards of the border, 
pending land acquisition cases and protests by the local population, which has led 
to delay in completion of the project. The constriction of border patrol roads have 
also started. However, most of the fencing constructed in the initial phase in West 
Bengal, Assam and Meghalaya have damaged due to adverse climatic conditions, 
repeated submergence, etc. 
 
However, all is not so well. Consider this: Bhumidhar Barman, a minister 
of Assam, told the state legislative assembly on February 10th, 2011 that only 219 
“foreigners” have been deported from the state between 2001 to November 2010, 
while over Rs 330 million have been spent for maintaining over 40 tribunals set 
up for the process of their identification and detection. The minister claimed that 
at least 15,835 persons were declared “foreigners” by the tribunals, while only 
219 of them could be deported. Most of the people declared “foreigners” were 
“missing”. The minister maintained that the total costs of maintaining each 
tribunal was about Rs 0.15 million per month (Assam Tribune (Guwahati), 11 
February 2011). It is, therefore, important to revisit some of the key problems. 
 
The stated border traverses through a range of natural and cultural 
landscape such as forests, lowlands, riverline areas and human settlements thereby 
making the construction of fencing and roads difficult. Further, there are unsettled 
border dispute in which both sides are least interested to resolve. Many people 
who were directed affected by the partition questioned the validity of the border 
because they claimed that the partition was done without their consent. The 
partition uprooted their livelihood since the border divided villages, towns, 
relatives, homes, markets and paddy fields. Since the people along the border 
share ethnic and linguistic ties it is natural for them to protect some of the aspiring 
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migrants who they consider as their ethnic kin. Thus, identifying who is a citizen 
and who is not is a difficult task in this part of the world. 
 
Another problem has been the politicization of immigration, especially in 
Assam and Tripura. The issue is highly politicised in which political parties 
accused each other of indulging in vote-bank politics. In Assam, the Bharatiya 
Janata Party and Asom Gana Parishad have been accusing the Indian National 
Congress (the party in power for most of the time after independence) of 
encouraging cross-border immigration to enlarge their support base. On its part, 
the Indian National Congress has accused the Bharatiya Janata Party of 
communalising the issue. Differences have also appeared at the highest level of 
the Assam government. In 2005, the then governor, Ajai Singh, drafted a report 
on illegal immigration into the state. But the chief minister, Tarun Gogoi, termed 
the report as a “worthless document based on hearsay rather than facts”. Gogoi 
alleged the report has created confusion among the people. The politicization has 
created distrust between the communities. In the post-independent period the 
focus had turned towards the Muslims accusing them of encouraging cross-border 
immigration. Such allegations have hurt them. In 2005, several hundreds of 
immigrants, mostly Muslims, were displaced from several regional towns of 
Assam after a drive undertaken by several ant-immigration groups. The All 
Assam Minorities Students’ Union, a Muslim student body, alleged that the 
minority communities have been targeted in the name of ousting illegal 
immigrants. It accused the All Assam Students’ Union of labeling the Bengali-
speaking Muslims as the “Bangladeshi infiltrators.” It warned of launching a 
similar drive against the Assamese people living in the minority-dominated areas 
of Goalpara and Dhubri districts (Indian Express (New Delhi), 3 August 2007). 
 
The government has been unable to invoke effective legal measures 
acceptable by all the people of Assam. Any legal measure continued to be 
contentious. For instance, the promulgation of the IMDT Act had caused division 
among the people. The Muslim groups supported it while other groups opposed it. 
When the IMDT Act was struck down by the supreme court the Muslim groups 
alleged that the Muslims would be harassed by the police in the name of detection 
of “foreigners.” By contrast, the other groups who were against the IMDT Act 
welcomed the ruling. 
 
Finally, administrative corruption has all along posed one of the biggest 
challenges in the implementation of the existing laws and schemes. The officials 
of the state usually helped the would-be migrants in fraudulently acquiring 
identity documents such as ration cards, birth certificates, domicile certificates 
and voters’ identity cards. When someone possesses such documents they can 
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establish the Indian nationality status. Finally, Bangladesh denies the presence of 





The discourse on immigration continues to ignore the contributions of the 
immigrants towards their host societies; instead they are projected as a threat or 
perhaps “exploiter” to the receiving societies. The immigrants have suffered due 
to the official positions taken by the respective states. The anti-immigration 
movements are the identity movements based on the notion of historic homeland 
for people and an exclusive entity for the formation of national identity.  
 
If globalisation and migration have to benefit people, ways have to be 
found to protect the interest of the local communities in decision which affects 
them. Market mechanism is inherently incapable of doing this, while countries 
including the democratic ones often neglect local in favour of overriding national 
interests. Thus the immigrants became the target because they are the most visible 
symbol of these changes, while the real causes are invisible, complex and difficult 
to influence (Castles 1998: 179-186). Since migration cannot be simply stop 
through police and fencing, it is therefore necessary to devise alternate policies 
keeping in mind the history and cultural ties of the sending and receiving areas. 
Such policies would help protect the interests of both the migrants and the 
nonmigrants. If India continues to insist only on border police and border fencing, 
the aspiring migrants will come through other ways. What is important is to 
accept the existence of numerous push-and-pull factors forcing people to move. 
India has to make policies in the interests of both the migrants and the 
nonmigrants; it cannot ignore one group at the expense of another. The first 
challenge before India is to maintain and update the record of its citizens through 
a specialised agency. In this process many of the recent immigrants are to be 
included because there is no way to distinguish between the migrants and the 
nonmigrants/the citizens and the noncitizens. India has to adopt a realistic 
approach. Once this is done take introduce the temporary work permit scheme for 
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